在道德背景下，“同理心”和“同情”之间的区别是充满活力和挑战性的。大卫·休谟和亚当·斯密的十八世纪文本使用了“同情”这个词，而不是“同理心”，尽管以同理心为标志的概念区别在他们的着作中做了必要的工作。在讨论了这些术语的早期用法之后，本文是历史性的。两种传统是有区别的。第一个是英美传统，它从休谟和史密斯延伸到迈克尔斯洛特二十一世纪的作品。斯蒂芬达尔沃尔的贡献适用于与休谟和史密斯合作。最后，在约翰罗尔斯和托马斯纳格尔的着作中探讨了同情，同情和利他的相互关系。第二个传统是大陆航空。它从约翰赫尔德的灵性延伸到埃德蒙胡塞尔，马丁海德格尔，马克斯舍勒和伊迪丝斯坦的现象学运动。对移情的有意分析与社会群体的构成直接相关，与“他者”有着广泛的规范关系。移情（Einfühlung）是一种特殊的（精神）行为，起源于胡塞尔的主体间性的上层结构，并在海德格尔，舍勒和斯坦因的影响下稳步迁移到社区的基础。选择哪些哲学家和思想家也取决于在当代关于同情，同情和道德的辩论中最有可能遇到的那些偶然事实。斯坦，胡塞尔和海德格尔主要是认识论，本体论和后神学，并且是任何当代的，正式的伦理理论参与的背景，这是本文的重点。舍勒将他对本质（wesenschau）的现象学直觉转向道德情感;他对交感神经形式多样性的分析是对这一主题的持久贡献。拉里·哈珀（Larry Hatab）和弗雷德里克·奥拉夫森（Frederick Olafson）等当代大陆思想家将海德格尔·米尔辛（Heideggerian Mitsein）和米特达辛（Mitdasein）（与世界其他人一起）作为道德的存在主义基础。弗里德里希·尼采，大屠杀和“其他”，尤其是埃马纽埃尔·列维纳斯的角色，是欧洲大陆伦理方法的标志。本文最后讨论了精神分析学科如何促成移情的作用。
澳大利亚麦考瑞大学Essay代写：伦理中的Empathy和 Sympathy
The distinction between “empathy” and “sympathy” in the context of ethics is a dynamic and challenging one. The eighteenth century texts of David Hume and Adam Smith used the word “sympathy,” but not “empathy,” although the conceptual distinction marked by empathy was doing essential work in their writings. After discussing the early uses of these terms, this article is organized historically. Two traditions are distinguished. The first is the Anglo-American tradition, and it extends from Hume and Smith to the twenty-first century work of Michael Slote. Stephen Darwall’s contribution is applied in engaging Hume and Smith. Finally, the interrelation of empathy, sympathy and altruism is explored in the work of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. The second tradition is the Continental one. It extends from the spirituality of Johann Herder to the phenomenological movement of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, and Edith Stein. The intentional analysis of empathy is directly relevant to the constitution of the social community in a broad, normative relationship with the “Other.” Empathy (Einfühlung) is sui generis an intentional (mental) act that starts out in the superstructure of intersubjectivity in Husserl and steadily migrates towards the foundation of community under the influence of Heidegger, Scheler, and Stein. The choice of which philosophers and thinkers to include is also determined by the contingent facts that those chosen are most likely to be encountered in contemporary debates about empathy, sympathy, and ethics. Stein, Husserl, and Heidegger are primarily epistemological, ontological, and post-onto-theological, and are in the background of any contemporary, formal engagement with ethical theories, which is the focus of the present article. Scheler turns his phenomenological intuition of essence (wesenschau) towards the moral sentiments; and his analysis of the diversity of sympathetic forms is a lasting contribution to the topic. Contemporary Continental thinkers such as Larry Hatab and Frederick Olafson associate empathy with Heideggerian Mitsein and Mitdasein (being in the world with others) as the existential foundation of ethics). The roles of Friedrich Nietzsche, the Holocaust, and the “Other,” especially in Emmanuel Levinas, are distinguishing marks of the ethical approach on the Continent. The article ends with a discussion of how the discipline of psychoanalysis contributes to the role of empathy.