现象保守主义是认识论中的一种理论，它大致寻求以对事物“出现”或“看似”的方式来证明信仰的理由。这种理论符合基本主义的内在形式 – 也就是说，一些信仰是非推理的（不是基于其他信仰），而信仰的理由或缺乏理由完全取决于信徒的内部。心理状态。直观的想法是，假设事物是他们看起来的方式是有道理的，除非并且直到有理由怀疑这一点。这个想法被用来解释特别是感性信念的理由和道德信仰的正当性。有些人认为它可以用来解释所有认知论证。有人声称，对现象保守主义（PC）的否认使得一个人处于一种自我毁灭的立场，即PC自然地从范式的内在主义直觉中产生，并且PC为哲学怀疑主义的威胁提供了唯一简单而自然的解决方案。批评者反对说，如果缺乏外观可靠的积极，独立的证据，不应该相信外表;该理论允许荒谬的信念为某些主题辩护;该理论允许非理性或不可靠的认知状态为信仰提供理由;并且该理论对何时以及在何种程度上推论产生信仰的正当性具有不可思议的含义。
Phenomenal Conservatism is a theory in epistemology that seeks, roughly, to ground justified beliefs in the way things “appear” or “seem” to the subject who holds a belief. The theory fits with an internalistic form of foundationalism—that is, the view that some beliefs are justified non-inferentially (not on the basis of other beliefs), and that the justification or lack of justification for a belief depends entirely upon the believer’s internal mental states. The intuitive idea is that it makes sense to assume that things are the way they seem, unless and until one has reasons for doubting this. This idea has been invoked to explain, in particular, the justification for perceptual beliefs and the justification for moral beliefs. Some believe that it can be used to account for all epistemic justification. It has been claimed that the denial of Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) leaves one in a self-defeating position, that PC naturally emerges from paradigmatic internalist intuitions, and that PC provides the only simple and natural solution to the threat of philosophical skepticism. Critics have objected that appearances should not be trusted in the absence of positive, independent evidence that appearances are reliable; that the theory allows absurd beliefs to be justified for some subjects; that the theory allows irrational or unreliable cognitive states to provide justification for beliefs; and that the theory has implausible implications regarding when and to what degree inferences produce justification for beliefs.