心理自我主义是我们所有行为基本上都是出于自身利益的理论。这一观点得到了几位哲学家的认可,其中包括Thomas Hobbes和Friedrich Nietzsche,并在一些博弈论中发挥了作用。自我感兴趣的行为是出于对自身利益的关注。显然,我们的大部分行为都属于这种行为。我喝了一杯水,因为我有兴趣解渴。我出去工作是因为我有兴趣获得报酬。但我们所有的行为都是自私的吗?从表面上看,似乎有很多行动都没有。例如:一个停下来帮助已经崩溃的人的驾驶者。一名士兵落在手榴弹上以保护他人免受爆炸。但心理自我主义者认为他们可以在不放弃理论的情况下解释这些行为。驾驶者可能会想,有一天她也需要帮助。所以她支持一种文化,我们帮助那些有需要的人。捐赠给慈善机构的人可能希望给别人留下深刻的印象,或者他们可能会试图避免内疚感,或者他们可能正在寻找一个善良的模糊感觉。落在手榴弹上的士兵可能希望获得荣耀,即使只是死后的那种。对心理利己主义的第一个也是最明显的反对意见是,有许多明显的例子表明人们在利他主义或无私地行为,将他人的利益放在他们自己的利益之上。刚刚给出的例子说明了这个想法。但正如已经指出的那样,心理自我主义者认为他们可以解释这种行为。但他们可以吗?批评者认为他们的理论依赖于对人类动机的错误描述。例如,建议那些捐赠给慈善机构,捐献血液或帮助有需要的人的人,都是出于避免感到内疚或渴望享受圣洁感的愿望。在某些情况下这可能是正确的,但肯定在许多情况下并非如此。事实上,我没有感到内疚或在做出某种行为后感到有道德可能是真的。但这通常只是我行动的副作用。我并不一定是为了获得这些感受。心理自我主义者认为,在底层,我们都是相当自私的。即使是我们形容为无私的人,也是为了自己的利益而做的事情。他们说,那些以表面价值采取无私行为的人是天真的或肤浅的。然而,与此相反,批评者可以争辩说,我们在自私和无私行为(和人)之间的区别是重要的。自私行为是指牺牲别人的利益的行为:例如:我贪婪地抓住了最后一块蛋糕。一种无私的行为是我将另一个人的利益置于我自己之上的行为:例如:我给他们最后一块蛋糕,即使我自己喜欢它。也许我这样做是因为我渴望帮助或取悦他人。从某种意义上说,在某种意义上,我可以被描述为满足我的欲望,即使我无私地行事。但这正是一个无私的人:即关心他人的人,他们想要帮助他们。我满足于帮助别人的愿望这一事实并不能否认我无私地行事。反之。这正是无私的人所拥有的那种欲望。它满足了我们对简单性的偏好。在科学中,我们喜欢通过展示它们全部由同一个力量控制来解释不同现象的理论。例如。牛顿的引力理论提供了一个解释苹果掉落,行星轨道和潮汐的原理。心理自我主义承诺通过将所有行为与一个基本动机联系起来来解释各种行为:自我利益它提供了一种头脑冷静,看似愤世嫉俗的人性观。这使我们关注的不是天真或外表。但是,对它的批评者来说,这个理论太简单了。如果意味着忽视相反的证据,那么头脑冷静并不是一种美德。例如,考虑一下如果你看一部两岁女孩开始绊倒在悬崖边上的电影你的感受。如果你是一个正常的人,你会感到焦虑。但为什么?这部电影只是一部电影;这不是真的。幼儿是个陌生人。你为什么要关心她发生了什么?危险的不是你。但你确实感到焦虑。为什么?对这种感觉的合理解释是,我们大多数人都对其他人有一种自然的关注,也许是因为我们本质上是社会存在者。这是David Hume提出的一系列批评。

澳大利亚迪肯大学心理学Essay代写:心理自我主义

Psychological egoism is the theory that all our actions are basically motivated by self-interest. It is a view endorsed by several philosophers, among them Thomas Hobbes and Friedrich Nietzsche, and has played a role in some game theory. A self-interested action is one that is motivated by a concern for one’s own interests. Clearly, most of our actions are of this sort. I get a drink of water because I have an interest in quenching my thirst. I show up for work because I have an interest in being paid. But are all our actions self-interested? On the face of it, there seem to be lots of actions that are not. For instance: A motorist who stops to help someone who has broken down. A soldier falling on a grenade to protect others from the explosion. But psychological egoists think they can explain such actions without abandoning their theory. The motorist might be thinking that one day she, too, could need help. So she supports a culture in which we help those in need. The person giving to charity might be hoping to impress others, or they might be trying to avoid feelings of guilt, or they might be looking for that warm fuzzy feeling one gets after doing a good deed. The soldier falling on the grenade might be hoping for glory, even if only the posthumous kind. The first and most obvious objection to psychological egoism is that there are lots of clear examples of people behaving altruistically or selflessly, putting the interests of others before their own. The examples just given illustrate this idea. But as already noted, the psychological egoists think they can explain actions of this kind. But can they? Critics argue that their theory rests on a false account of human motivation. Take , for instance, the suggestion that people who give to charity, or who donate blood, or who help people in need, are motivated by either a desire to avoid feeling guilty or by a desire to enjoy feeling saintly. This may be true in some cases, but surely it simply isn’t true in many. The fact that I don’t feel guilty or do feel virtuous after performing a certain action may be true. But this is often just a side effect of my action. I didn’t necessarily do it in order to get these feelings. Psychological egoists suggest that we are all, at bottom, quite selfish. Even people who we describe as unselfish are really doing what they do for their own benefit. Those who take unselfish actions at face value, they say, are naïve or superficial. Against this, though, the critic can argue that the distinction we all make between selfish and unselfish actions (and people) is an important one. A selfish action is one that sacrifices someone else’s interests to my own: e.g. I greedily grab the last slice of cake. An unselfish action is one where I place another person’s interests above my own: e.g. I offer them the last piece of cake, even though I’d like it myself. Perhaps it is true that I do this because I have a desire to help or please others. In that sense, I could be described, in some sense, as satisfying my desires even when I act unselfishly. But this is exactly what an unselfish person is: namely, someone who cares about others, who wants to help them. The fact that I am satisfying a desire to help others is no reason to deny that I am acting selflessly. On the contrary. That’s exactly the sort of desire that unselfish people have. It satisfies our preference for simplicity. In science we like theories that explain diverse phenomena by showing them to all be controlled by the same force. E.g. Newton’s theory of gravity offers a single principle that explains a falling apple, the orbits of the planets, and the tides. Psychological egoism promises to explain every kind of action by relating them all to one fundamental motive: self-interest it offers a hard-headed, seemingly cynical view of human nature. This appeals to our concern not to be naïve or taken in by appearances. To its critics, though, the theory is too simple. And being hard-headed is not a virtue if it means ignoring contrary evidence. Consider, for instance how you feel if you watch a film in which a two year old girl starts stumbling toward the edge of a cliff. If you’re a normal person, you’ll feel anxious. But why? The film is only a film; it isn’t real. And the toddler is a stranger. Why should you care what happens to her? It isn’t you that is in danger. Yet you do feel anxious. Why? A plausible explanation of this feeling is that most of us have a natural concern for others, perhaps because we are, by nature, social beings. This is a line of criticism advanced by David Hume.

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