在Tinker诉Des Moines一案中，最高法院解决了戴第一修正案的戴臂章是否受到保护的问题。一些学生选择戴着黑色臂章上学来抗议越南战争。 1968年4月26日，保罗·罗伯特·科恩走进洛杉矶法院。当他沿着走廊走下去时，他的夹克突出地写着“f * ck the draft”引起了警察的注意。科恩被立即逮捕的原因是他违反了加利福尼亚州刑法典415，该法律禁止“恶意和故意扰乱任何社区或个人的和平或安宁”。 。 。通过。 。 。进攻性的行为。“科恩坚持认为夹克的目标是描绘他对越南战争的感受。相隔仅一年，这三个案件都要求最高法院确定政府是否可以禁止其公民焚烧美国国旗。在所有三起案件中，法院认为在抗议期间焚烧美国国旗是象征性的言论，因此受到第一修正案的保护。与他们在科恩的控股相似，法院认为，该行为的“冒犯性”并没有为该州提供禁止它的正当理由。法院认为，学校不能仅仅因为学生在学校的财产上限制学生的讲话。只有在“实质性和实质性地”干扰学校活动时，才能限制言论。臂章是一种象征性的演讲形式，并没有有效地干扰学校的活动。法院裁定学校在没收乐队并将学生送回家时违反了学生的言论自由。美国诉艾希曼与美国诉哈格蒂案一起辩论，是对国会于1989年通过“国旗保护法”的回应。在艾希曼，法院重点关注该法案的具体用语。它允许通过仪式“处置”旗帜而不是通过政治抗议焚烧旗帜。这意味着国家试图仅禁止某些形式的表达内容。最高法院裁定，加利福尼亚不能将言论定为刑事犯罪，因为它是“令人反感的”。国家有兴趣确保言论不会强迫暴力。然而，科恩的夹克是一种象征性的代表，几乎没有起到刺激身体暴力的作用。他走过走廊。科恩诉加利福尼亚州坚持认为，一个国家必须证明象征性的言论是为了煽动暴力才能禁止它。该案件借用了Tinker诉Des Moines案，表明恐惧本身无法提供理由违反某人的第一和第十四修正案的权利。
澳大利亚阿德莱德大学社会学Assignment代写：象征性的演讲
In Tinker v. Des Moines, the Supreme Court addressed whether wearing armbands in protest was protected under the First Amendment. Several students had chosen to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to school. On April 26, 1968, Paul Robert Cohen walked into the Los Angeles Courthouse. As he moved down a corridor, his jacket, which prominently read “f*ck the draft” caught the attention of officers. Cohen was promptly arrested on the basis that he’d violated California Penal Code 415, which prohibited, “maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct.” Cohen maintained that the goal of the jacket was to depict his feelings about the Vietnam War. Only a year apart, all three of these cases asked the Supreme Court to determine whether the government could prohibit their citizens from burning the American flag. In all three cases, the court held that burning the American flag during the course of a protest was symbolic speech and was therefore protected under the First Amendment. Similar to their holding in Cohen, the Court found that the “offensiveness” of the act did not offer the state a legitimate reason to prohibit it. The court held that the school could not restrict the students’ speech simply because the students were on the school’s property. Speech could only be restricted if it “materially and substantially” interfered with school activities. Armbands were a form of symbolic speech that did not meaningfully interfere with school activities. The court ruled that the school violated the students’ freedom of speech when they confiscated the bands and sent the students home. U.S. v. Eichman, argued in conjunction with U.S. v. Haggerty, was a response to Congress’ passage of the Flag Protection Act in 1989. In Eichman, the Court focused on the specific language of the act. It allowed for the “disposal” of flags through a ceremony but not the burning of flags through political protest. This meant that the state sought to only prohibit the content of certain forms of expression. The Supreme Court ruled that California could not criminalize speech on the basis that it was “offensive.” The state has an interest in ensuring that speech does not compel violence. However, Cohen’s jacket was a symbolic representation that did little to inspire physical violence as he walked through the corridor. Cohen v. California upheld the idea that a state must prove that symbolic speech is intended to incite violence in order to prohibit it. The case drew upon Tinker v. Des Moines to show that fear itself cannot provide a reason to violate someone’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.